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Introduction
At a decade and a half, public-private partnerships (PPPs) are old enough for both economic theory and empirical investigation to have tackled most key economic and financial issues that are associated with them (see the EIB Papers, 2005, for an overview). Most notably, the theoretical analysis of why and under what conditions PPPs may be superior to traditional public procurement of investment projects in terms of productive efficiency has been established in the framework of the theory of incomplete contracts (see Välilä, 2005 , for an overview). Also, with an increasing number of PPP projects in operation, it has been possible to quantify some of the cost savings that can be achieved through PPPs, at least in the procurement phase of the project (Leahy, 2005) .
However, one issue that has not received much attention so far concerns transaction costs in PPPs. Transaction costs in this context refer to the costs of establishing and maintaining a partnership; more specifically, they encompass legal, financial, and technical advisory costs incurred by both public and private sectors in the procurement and operational phases of a project. Costs for organising the bidding process; participating in it; negotiating the contract between the public sector and the winning bidder; monitoring the private sector partner's compliance with the contract and also renegotiating the contract during its life-cycle would all be included among transaction costs.
While there is widespread perception among practitioners and academics alike that PPPs are associated with "high" transaction costs, to the best of our knowledge, no systematic study has yet been undertaken to quantify such costs and to analyse their determinants.
The National Audit Office (NAO) in the UK provides anecdotal evidence of high transaction costs in many of its reports (see, for example, NAO, 2003 and 2004) , as does the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the House of Commons in the UK (PAC, 2003) . Indeed, a project size of at least £20 million is considered necessary for a PPP to be a viable option in the UK (HM Treasury, 2003) . Torres and Pina (2001) report some evidence related to the US, noting that it has been reported that the monitoring of the performance of the private sector partner in PPP type of arrangements entails extra costs anywhere between 3 and 25 percent of the contract value. As a consequence, it has been recommended in the US context that monitoring costs of 10 percent of the contract value be budgeted in such arrangements.
Against this background, the aim of this paper is to offer the first systematic assessment of the magnitude and determinants of transaction costs in PPPs. Conversely, this paper does not attempt to compare transaction costs in PPPs to those in traditionally procured public investment projects. Neither does it attempt to contrast transaction costs with the cost savings that PPPs can, under certain circumstances, generate. Both these important topics are for future research to address.
Following a brief discussion of why one would expect transaction costs in PPPs to exceed those in traditionally procured public investment projects in Section 2, the data material used in this study is described in Section 3, and the empirical methodologies employed are explained in Section 4. Section 5 reports the results concerning the magnitude of transaction costs in PPPs. Section 6 turns the focus on the determinants of the transaction costs, and Section 7 summarises and concludes.
Transaction costs in PPPs: some theoretical considerations
There are several reasons why transaction costs in PPPs would be high, especially compared to traditional procurement of public investment projects. The main sources of higher transaction costs in PPPs are their long-term character, ownership and financing structures, and risk-sharing features. Due to all these reasons, the degree of contractual incompleteness is high in the case of PPPs, and attempts to reduce that contractual incompleteness give rise to correspondingly high transaction costs. Consequently, the search (tendering and bidding), contracting, and monitoring processes become more resource-consuming than in traditional short-term contracting aimed to supply assets, rather than services, to the public sector. Negotiating the contract is especially costly, not least due to the high cost of advisory services, and such costs are not limited to the predelivery phase, as renegotiation is almost inevitable in contracts that stretch over decades.
Apart from the direct costs related to tendering, contract negotiation, and monitoring, Domberger and Jensen (1997) emphasise that the long contract period gives also rise to economic costs indirectly. The enforcement of a long-term contract can be difficult because the threat of contract termination can only be used if the public sector is committed to buying the asset at fair value in case of termination; otherwise, expropriation risk would need to be factored into project costs. This cost is obviously the less important the smaller and less specific is the initial investment in the underlying asset. In addition, a long contract period lessens the disciplining power of ex ante competition, and it increases the likelihood of costly contract renegotiation.
Also, that a PPP is established for service provision using privately owned assets might entail higher monitoring costs than in-house provision of the same service. The provision of most services is relatively difficult to measure and monitor, especially in terms of quality. While in-house provision, too, necessitates quality control, it can be argued that private asset ownership implies higher monitoring costs for the public sector. After all, if the asset were in public ownership the public sector could always ensure the desired service quality, while private ownership can jeopardise service quality due to excessive investment in productive efficiency. It is therefore more costly to maintain the desired service quality under private asset ownership.
The high transaction costs can have the potential to erode the cost savings achieved through a PPP structure. Apart from their direct negative impact on the financial and economic viability of the project, the high cost of bidding constitutes an obvious hurdle for potential bidders to enter the bidding process. This, in turn, undermines the power of ex ante competition, which is in many infrastructure and public service sectors the only form of competition that can exist. The inability to harness the power of ex ante competition to support the quest for productive efficiency will, in turn, deter the creation of value for money through a PPP. Besides, as auction theory demonstrates, the design of the bidding process so as to avoid inefficiencies due to collusion or opportunistic behavior is difficult in general and in the case of long-term contracts in particular.
Description of data
One reason for the absence of empirical studies of the transaction costs is obviously the lack of appropriate data. The problem is twofold: there is only limited information about transaction costs, and even when such information exists, it is often confidential in character. Add to that the still limited experience of the operation of PPP projects, especially from a longer-term perspective, and it would seem next to impossible to say anything general about the topic.
There are, however, a number of data sources that can be combined to give an overview of the magnitude and also determinants of transaction costs in PPPs. For the public sector's part, publicly available information compiled by the NAO and PAC can be used to create a database with 55 PPP projects in 6 different sectors of the UK economy. The projects are identified in Appendix 1. The sample on the public sector's transaction costs, which is illustrated in Graphs 1-3 below, covers some 10 percent all signed PPP projects through December 2004 by number and 15 percent by value. 1 The actual number of projects is 64, but some were procured as a bundle, with reporting for the bundles aggregating all projects in it. This reduced the number of reporting units (individual projects or bundles) to 55. 2 Information about 14 projects was acquired by e-mail inquiries. Capital value £m
Nr of projects
Source: EIB.
Graph 6. Winning bidder's transaction costs: Sample by year
ic sector transaction costs, the sample on the private sector's transaction osts is confined to the procurement phase. However, as mentioned in Section 2, as constrained as explained above, the empirical methods at could be used to analyse the data are also constrained. Specifically, the use of 
Empirical methodology
Given that data availability is th standard statistical tests would be questionable, as they hinge on assumptions about the population distribution of the variables of interest that cannot be supported by our small sample size.
One can, however, resort to non-parametric tests to analyse the data. In examining the portance of the various possible determinants of transaction costs in Section 6 below, first test, the Kruskal-Wallis test, is used to assess whether all samples, which can be f different sizes, come from identical populations or not. 3 In our case, the samples t are thus:
notes the mean ranks of a sample. In other words, the null hypothesis has it at the mean ranks of all samples are equal, while the alternative has it that at least one To test these hypotheses, the Kruskal-Wallis te
where n denotes the size of a sample; k denotes the number of samples; and R denotes the m of ranks in a sample. For very small samples (n < 5 for each i and k < 4), the critical 
For sufficiently large sample sizes, the test statistic z is approximately normally distributed with mean E(T) and standard deviation σ T .
case of the Kruskal-Wallis test. It an be used, for example, to test whether transaction costs differ between any two efore embarking on the analysis of the determinants of transaction costs, let us establish ection 3, there is actual data on the bidding and contract egotiation costs for the public sector as well as for the winning bidder. Notably, we are which only covers the UK, varying roughly between 1 and 7 percent of the apital value of the project across sectors (see Section 6.2. below). g bidder's costs into idding and contract negotiation costs was available, the split is even, with bidding costs Intuitively, the Wilcoxon rank sum test assesses how two samples are located with respect to one another, based on ranked data as in the c countries, sectors, project sizes, etc.
Size of transaction costs
B their level. As described in S n interested in the total procurement phase transaction costs to the economy, not just the financial cost of the project, so we need to add the bidding costs for the failed bidders. In the absence of actual data on failed bidders' costs they need to be estimated, as explained below.
The public sector's bidding and contract negotiation costs average 3.5 percent in our dataset, c The winning bidder's costs vary between 3.0 and 5.7 percent across sectors, averaging 3.8 percent. In the 8 projects where a breakdown of the winnin b 13 amounting to 1.9 percent and contract negotiation costs to another 1.9 percent of the project's capital value.
As for the failed bidders, costs for them were estimated based on information about the winning bidder's bidding costs and the average number of bidders for the projects in the mple. Each failed bidder can be reasonably assumed to spend neither more nor much the apital value of the sampled projects, with the cost to public sector at 3.5 percent, cost to to the failed bidders at about 5 percent.
Notably, this estimate is unlikely to be significantly biased upward because of doublecounting that could arise if the winning bidder would systematically inflate his bidding sa less than the winning bidder on the bidding process. As the winning bidder spends on average some 1.9 percent of the project's capital value on bidding, and as the average number of bidders in our sample is 4, the costs incurred by the 3 failed bidders amount to some 5 percent of the project's capital value. In sum, the procurement phase transaction costs average well over 10 percent of c the winning bidder at 3.8 percent, and the cost costs to cover his costs for bidding unsuccessfully for other projects. First, this would only happen if the winning bidder's bidding costs were always reimbursed by the public sector, which is not the rule. Second, even in cases where the public sector reimburses ch costs, our estimates would not be double-counting them as the public sector figures the analysis to follow mainly considers ansaction costs incurred by the winning bidder.
the absence of a rigorous theoretical model that could be used to determine a set of wing:
• number of bidders (proxying the intensity of competition at the bidding stage); pothesis that decline over time as experience with PPPs accumulates, ). su do not, to the best of our knowledge, include any such reimbursement. Besides, the winning bidder is most likely to recover his bidding costs through higher project cost rather than inflating his own bidding costs.
Determinants of transaction costs
Having established their magnitude, let us then turn to an analysis of the determinants of procurement phase transaction costs in PPPs. Because of the absence of actual data on the costs of failed bidders mentioned above, tr In determinants for the procurement phase transaction costs in PPPs, we resort to a more ad hoc -approach and investigate the relationship between transaction costs and a number of variables that could conceivably affect the magnitude of transaction costs and for which data are available. Such variables include the follo
• project country (approximating differences between legal systems);
• economic sector;
• project size (capital value);
• length of procurement process (approximating, among other things, the complexity of the project);
• the year when the project was signed (accounting for the hy transaction costs facilitating the set-up process Sources: NAO, PAC, EIB.
As the graph above illustrates, there is some cross-country variation. The costs are highest in the UK at about double those in Portugal and some two-thirds higher than in
Ireland and the Netherlands. That the UK has higher costs would appear obvious because of its common law legal system, which necessitates high legal advisory costs. However, if that were the only factor at play, the costs in Ireland should be high, too. What other factors may play a role is considered below.
Sector
As regards cross-sectoral variation, the graph below suggests that the transaction costs are roughly equal for the public sector and the winning bidder in hospital and road projects, adding up to 8 and 6 percent of the project's capital value, respectively.
Graph 9. Procurement phase transaction costs by sector (in % of capital value)
bidder shoulders three-quarters of them. There is no obvious explanation to this observation, but there is some anecdotal evidence suggesting that the public sector tends to use in-house resources instead of external technical advisors (e.g., architects) in school projects, which would tend to reduce its explicitly accounted costs. Of course, the economic cost of using In school projects, the total comes also to about 7.5 percent, although the winning in-house resources would still be there and should be added to the explicitly accounted
There is also significant variation between the 3 sectors for which we only have data on public sector transaction costs. Notably, the ICT sector includes an outlier, where transaction costs amounted to over 20 percent of the project's capital value. Without that outlier, the average for the ICT sector would be 3 percent.
Interestingly, the public sector's transaction costs for prison projects appear very small.
Obviously, this does not necessarily mean that overall transaction costs are low: as with school projects, the winning bidder may bear the bulk of them or they can be, at least in part, not explicitly accounted for.
.
Size of project
urning to the size (capital value) of the project, small projects are associated with higher costs to get the total economic cost.
6
T transaction costs (relative to the size of the project) for both public and private sectors.
For the public sector, as illustrated below, projects with a capital value below £25 million have significantly higher transaction costs than bigger projects. For the private sector, projects with a capital value below £100 million are significantly more expensive to bid for and negotiate than especially very big projects.
Graph 10. Procurement phase transaction costs for the public sector by project size (in % of capital value)
Sources: NAO, PAC.
Graph 11. Procurement phase transaction costs for the winning bidder by project ze (in % of capital value)
Note that the small number of projects in the sample necessitates different size classification for the analysis of public and private sector transaction costs, respectively. 
2%

3%
These findings lend some support to the notion that the high transaction costs in PPPs necessitate a minimum project size for a partnership to be a financially and economically viable option. In the UK, a project size in excess of £20 is now considered necessary for the PPP option to be considered in the first place.
Procurement time
As regards the procurement time for the project-which reflects in part the complexity of the project-it turns out, unsurprisingly, that projects with long procurement time are ssociated with significantly higher transaction costs, at least for the public sector. More ms to be a statistically significant structural break in transaction osts when procurement time exceeds 50 months: projects that take longer than that to below 50 months. hence, interval lengths other than those considered would weaken the power of tests employed.
Number of bidders
One would expect While there is no obvious economic reason why transaction costs for the winning bidder would peak with exactly three bidders, it is conceivable that the explanation lies in the way that the presence of three bidders combines the intensity of competition and the likelihood for a bid to succeed. From the perspective of an individual bidder, the presence f two other bidders renders the bidding process at the same time competitive and asonably likely to result in success. Therefore, any bidder has the incentives to spend uite a lot to win the contract. Such incentives are weaker if either the number of bidders smaller (which curtails competition and increases the likelihood of winning even if ttle is spent) or larger (which reduces the likelihood of winning).
hile the absence of competition would therefore seem to be associated with relatively w costs of bidding and contract negotiation, it is likely that it increases costs down the ad as the lack of competition is likely to result in higher overall costs of the project to e public sector and in a higher probability of contract renegotiation during its life cycle. 3% 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Winning bidder Public Public-hospital Sources: NAO, PAC, EIB.
There is no statistically significant trend in the private sector transaction costs. Notably, the extreme values for the private sector (1998 and 1999) only represent one single observation each and should therefore be taken with a grain of salt. Similarly, there is no significant trend in the public sector transaction costs overall, nor in hospital projects.
These findings contrast with the efforts, most advanced in the UK, to reduce transaction sing PPP contracts. While the time series analysed above remain short, ne cannot at this stage reject the possibility that PPP contracts necessitate such a high andardisation remain limited by necessity.
costs by standardi o degree of individual tailoring that benefits of st
Conclusions
This first systematic attempt at quantifying the transaction costs of PPPs suggests the following conclusions. First, even if only the transaction costs related to the procurement hase are considered-thus ignoring the additional costs of monitoring and renegotiating capital value of the project. The public sector and the winning bidder's costs reach some 7 percent, which is split between the public sector and the winning bidder roughly equally in hospital and road projects, while the winning bidder shoulders the bulk of the costs in school projects. In addition, the aggregate costs incurred by failed bidders can be estimated at some 5 percent of the project's capital value, brining the total procurement phase transaction costs to well over 10 percent.
Second, transaction costs (in percent of projects' capital value) to the public sector and the winning bidder vary between countries (legal systems) and sectors, and they are significantly higher in small projects (below £25 million for the public sector) and in projects that take long (over 50 months) to procure. In contrast, neither experience in p partnerships nor the number of bidders affect the costs to the public sector and e winning bidder.
hese results offer some first insights into the issue, but it is important to recognise what gs therwise achieved by a PPP structure, although that extent would seem to be significant. p the contract over its life-cycle-they amount on average to well over 10 percent of the setting u th T they do not do. They do not tell us anything about the magnitude of the difference between traditional public procurement of investment projects and PPPs in terms of transaction costs; however, the prior remains that PPPs are more expensive to set up. 
